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This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) reforms on the 
technology flows between the U.S. and countries where U.S. multinationals have established 
affiliates. We use patent citations as a proxy for knowledge spillovers to examine whether the 
diffusion of new technology between the host countries and the U.S. is accelerated by the 
reforms. We test the hypothesis that strengthening patent protection facilitates knowledge 
flows (in the form of patent citations) between U.S. multinationals and their subsidiaries in 
the reforming countries and between other U.S. firms and reforming countries domestic 
firms. Our results suggest that the reforms favor innovative efforts of domestic firms in the 
reforming countries rather than U.S. affiliates efforts. In other words, reforms mediate the 
technology flows from the U.S. to the reforming countries.
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21. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates the diffusion of new knowledge between 
countries. Because technology spillovers tend to be localized, one of the reasons why 
multinationals (MNCs) open overseas subsidiaries, in industry clusters with leading 
technologies, is to get access to new critical innovations. Often, their affiliates can contribute 
to the domestic knowledge stock of their host countries. Local companies in these countries
have easier access to new technologies developed by foreign laboratories conducting R&D 
there. Even when the affiliates are not oriented towards innovation, their internal 
organization and social networks facilitate knowledge spillovers from their home to their 
host countries.
The intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a country is one of the factors that 
play a critical role in the decision of multinationals to open a subsidiary in that country. It 
has a critical impact on the type of activity conducted by affiliates, as well. Strong IPR can 
encourage multinationals to open subsidiaries that develop new technologies or products
and draw upon technical innovations developed by the parent firm in the home country 
because they are protected against imitation by local rivals. Affiliates in host countries with 
weak IPR may be more oriented towards adjusting existing products to the local markets. 
MNCs may limit the activities conducted by their affiliates in countries that pose a high risk
of imitation. Tightening the IPR protection may change the scope of activity of these 
subsidiaries, which might become oriented more towards exploration of new technologies 
rather than exploitation of existing knowledge. Changes in the affiliates’ scope of activity 
would entail changes in the way knowledge diffuses internationally between the home and 
the host country of the affiliate or changes in the type of technologies that are deployed 
overseas by multinationals. 
The 1990s saw major reforms of the IPR laws and their enforcement in many 
developing countries, as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement set minimum standards for intellectual property regulation for all members of the 
World Trade Organization. This paper studies the impact of these reforms on the knowledge 
spillovers facilitated by the presence of subsidiaries in the reforming countries. It analyzes
3the relationship between IPR strength and the diffusion of new technologies. We analyze the 
impact of the reforms on the technology flows from the country undertaking FDI in a few 
reforming countries. In other words, we test whether the IPR reforms facilitate the diffusion 
of international knowledge. This paper tests empirically whether knowledge diffuses at a 
higher rate after countries have undertaken reforms of their patent regimes. We study 
technology spillovers in the form of patent citations to prior art, as the analysis of citations
has been the dominant way to address questions of knowledge flows. We expect to find that 
stronger IPR facilitates international knowledge diffusion. Our analysis consists of two parts:
First, we study the citing patterns of affiliates of multinational corporations 
conducting R&D in 12 reforming countries. Tighter protection of IPR could influence the
parent firms to deploy new critical technologies because the new patent laws reduce the fear 
of imitation. One would expect to see technology flows from parent firms in the U.S. to 
their affiliates increase after the reforms. We test empirically whether subsidiaries’ citations 
to their parent companies in the U.S. are more frequent after the reforms of the patent 
systems in the host countries. Although one might expect an increase in this frequency, we 
do not find evidence to support our hypothesis. However, the reforms might affect the flow 
of knowledge in a different way. After the implementation of the reforms, the type of 
technology transferred from the parent to the affiliate might change. The multinational 
might allow its subsidiaries to use its critical innovations, technologies that it might have 
restricted from spreading before the reform from fear of imitation in a country with a weak 
patent system. We look deeper, at different characteristics of the citations made by the U.S. 
affiliates. Even if the frequency has not changed after the reforms, changes in these citations’ 
characteristics could indicate important benefits for the reforming countries. After the 
reforms, the affiliates might cite patents that are cited more or that make more citations.
They might cite patents that are more “general” (cited by a wider range of technological 
fields) or patents that are more “original” (that cite a wider range of technological classes). 
We look for any changes in these characteristics that might suggest diffusion of more 
important or broader innovations between the U.S. and the reforming country. We explore 
the variation before and after reforms in the measures of originality (range of classes that are 
cited by the patent), generality (field range of patents that cite this patent), and number of 
citations made or received developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002). We still find no 
significant changes after reforms, with one exception. Our results show a decline after 
4reforms in the importance or impact of patents assigned to American MNCs that are cited 
by their subsidiaries, when we use the number of citations received as an indicator of the 
performance of patents. In other words, patents of MNCs cited after reforms by their 
affiliates receive fewer citations. 
Second, one would expect to see an increase in technology spillovers from U.S. 
companies to domestic firms in the reforming countries. As empirical studies suggest that
distance inhibits knowledge flows, the geographic proximity to U.S. affiliates would give 
domestic firms easier access to American knowledge generated by U.S. companies after their 
countries have undertaken IPR reforms. In the second part of the analysis, we turn our 
attention towards the way the citing patterns of domestic companies in the reforming 
countries have changed after the reforms of the IPR systems. We do not find evidence that 
local firms make citations to U.S. companies more frequently. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that patents assigned to American firms that are cited after reforms by reforming 
countries’ domestic firms receive more citations, on the average. In other words, we find a 
relative increase in the importance of U.S. patents cited by local companies after reforms.
In the light of our previous result, we conclude that the reforms are beneficial for the
reforming countries. They favor innovative efforts of the domestic firms in these countries 
rather than that of U.S. affiliates there. More important technologies or innovations with a 
larger impact are transferred from firms in the U.S. to domestic companies in the reforming 
countries after the reforms. The reasoning is highly intuitive. If a country institutes rigorous 
reforms, U.S. companies will be less concerned about sharing their knowledge with 
subsidiaries in the host country, and more willing to produce and market high-technology 
goods in the reformed country. Because this increases the effective proximity to advanced 
knowledge, reforms improve the ability of the host country’s firms to access and make use 
of U.S. knowledge. The policy implication is obvious: countries should be much more eager 
to undertake TRIP-related reforms than most have been. Thus, our paper brings evidence 
that reforms of the IPR mediate the transfer of new technologies to domestic companies in 
the reforming countries, fostering the innovative activity by locals. Contrary to what we 
might expect, the reforms do not encourage innovation conducted by American affiliates in 
these countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
IPR reforms in the 12 countries studied. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the prior 
5literature. Section 4 illustrates the methodology, Section 5 describes the dataset construction, 
Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Reforms of the IPR system
Numerous initiatives have tried to strengthen the IPR globally. The most significant 
change in global IPR protection is the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIP), negotiated as a founding component of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Before the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) dominated IPR multilateral rulemaking. In the 1980s, the U.S. became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the WIPO’s enforcement of the IPR conventions. As a result, 
IPR was introduced in the trade deliberations of the Uruguay Round by the American 
negotiators, supported by the EU, Japan and other first world states.
TRIP requires numerous developing countries to strengthen their IPR regimes by 
setting minimum standards to be fulfilled. It covers all aspects of IPR, including patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, as well as the enforcement of these stronger rights. 
As a core component of the WTO, any country that joins the WTO seeking to obtain easy 
access to the international markets opened by the organization, has to adhere to TRIP. One 
example was China, who strengthened its IPR system to comply with the TRIP before 
becoming a member of the WTO. 
Although the TRIP agreement constitutes the most important attempt of 
harmonization in the area of IPR, it remains a work in progress and there are still significant 
differences among countries. Using the annual National Trade Estimate Reports of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), Maskus (2000) makes inferences about the 
evolution of the IPR system in selected countries.  Table 1 presents his estimates, an
overview of the IPR protection changes between 1986 and 1998. We should bear in mind 
that the descriptors used – weak, moderate, good, and strong –offer only a rough description 
of the IPR system in the countries taken into consideration and summarize the views of 
USTR. Although implementation of the reforms in many countries is an ongoing process, 
there is one turning point in the reform process of the patent system of each of these 
countries, a point when the IPR system suffered a major change (Branstetter, Fisman and 
Foley (2004), Maskus (2000)). That is the year taken to be the year of the reform in our 
6analysis and it is illustrated in the last column of Table 1. Comparing the descriptors chosen 
for 1998 with those for 1986, we get the general impression that these 12 countries 
undertook patent reforms that led to considerable tightening of the protection of IPR. 
Table 1. Evolution of IPR protection 
Country 1986 1998 Reform Year
Argentina
Laws Weak Moderate 1996
Enforcement/Administration Weak Weak
Brazil
Laws Weak Good 1997
Enforcement/Administration Weak Weak
China
Laws Absent Good 1993
Enforcement/Administration Absent Weak
Indonesia
Laws Absent Moderate 1991
Enforcement/Administration Absent Weak
Japan
Laws Good Strong 1995
Enforcement/Administration Weak Good
South Korea
Laws Weak Strong 1987
Enforcement/Administration Weak Good
Mexico
Laws Weak Strong 1991
Enforcement/Administration Weak Moderate
The Philippines
Laws Weak Good 1997
Enforcement/Administration Weak Moderate
Spain
Laws Moderate Strong 1986
Enforcement/Administration Weak Strong
Taiwan
Laws Weak Strong 1993
Enforcement/Administration Weak Weak
Thailand
Laws Weak Good 1992
Enforcement/Administration Weak Weak
Turkey
Laws Weak Good 1995
Enforcement/Administration Weak Moderate
Source: Maskus (2000)
7The agreement sets minimum standards in all areas related to IPR, but the most 
important changes are in the area of patents. It strengthens the scope of the patent rights, it 
mandates a minimum of 20 years of protection from the application date, and it sets 
standards for the efficient enforcement of IPR. The agreement requires a broader definition 
of patentable subject matter. Patents must be granted in “all fields of technology”. Many 
countries, like Spain, Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, or Turkey had to extend the protection of 
patents to include areas such as chemicals, food products or pharmaceuticals. In addition, 
before the reforms, inventors could generally patent the process through which the product 
was obtained, but not the product itself. 
Countries like Japan, Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines, or Brazil changed the 
administration of the patent system. Japan eliminated the pre-grant opposition system in 
favor of a post-grant opposition regime. Before 1995, any person could file written 
opposition to a patent application within three months of its publication, leading to increases 
in the file-grant lag and “patent flooding”. The post-grant opposition system allows 
opposition to patents following publication of the patent grant. Mexico abolished in 1991 its 
old patent system in favor of a new one. Other countries that changed the patent laws, as 
well as their administration, were Brazil, Spain, Turkey, and the Philippines. Spain revised its 
patent system in 1986, as one condition for its entry into the European Union. 
Implementing the changes was delayed until 1992. Turkey tightened its protection laws 
anticipating a free-trade agreement with the EU. South Korea and Taiwan are examples of 
countries that undertook reforms to strengthen their patent systems due to domestic 
commercial interests. Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines responded to TRIP obligations 
by adopting stronger protection only in the late 1990s. China undertook reforms in the 
1990s, but the enforcement of these reforms is still inefficient.
As Table 1 illustrates, in 1998, as in 1986, there were major differences among these 
12 countries in the level of IPR protection and its enforcement. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, some countries undertook reforms that changed the IPR laws, others undertook 
reforms that altered the administration of the laws, whereas some reforms targeted both the 
laws and their enforcement and administration. In the methodology section, we address how 
we deal in our analysis with these significant differences between reforms in each country.
83. Related Literature
The impact of IPR shifts on innovation has become an important question in the 
economics of technological change. Among the theoretical papers that analyze the impact of 
IPR changes on the global welfare, Helpman (1993) suggests that tighter IPR can, under 
certain conditions, decrease global welfare. The author uses a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, in which the North innovates and manufactures products, and then production is 
transferred to the South through imitation. He argues that, as the cost of imitation rises,
tighter IPR shifts production to the North. As demand for labor increases in the North,
Northern wages increase. Transferring production to the higher cost region decreases 
efficiency. Higher Northern wages raise the cost of R&D, discouraging innovation. Lai 
(1998) modifies Helpman (1993)’s model by allowing Northern firms to undertake FDI. He 
argues that, when imitation is the only channel of production transfer, tighter IPR lowers the 
rate of innovation, similar to Helpman (1993)’s model. However, when Northern firms can 
undertake FDI, stronger IPR increases the expected lives of the monopolies and the returns 
to FDI and multinationals move more quickly to the South, increasing the rate of 
innovation. Glass and Saggi (2002) endogenize imitation by the South. They argue that there 
are two effects of stronger IPR: “a resource wasting effect” according to which tighter IPR 
makes imitation more costly, it draws resources into less efficient imitation in the South, 
raising the scarcity of Southern resources and decreasing profits from FDI; and “an imitation 
disincentive effect” according to which production is transferred to the North due to a 
decreased level of FDI and resources are drawn into production and away from innovation 
in the North. 
Besides theoretical studies that analyze global welfare in the presence of IPR 
reforms, the literature deals with the impact of changes in IPR on international trade. 
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) test empirically whether exporting firms take account of local 
patent laws in their decision to export in different countries. They find evidence of a positive 
relationship between international trade and importing country patent regime strength. 
Smith’s (1999) empirical study confirms the theory that IPR and international trade are 
related. She argues that weak patent rights discourage U.S. exports to countries with a high 
risk of imitation. Thus, tighter IPR in these countries would encourage U.S. exports to their 
markets. Nevertheless, in nations that pose a low risk of imitation, the strengthening of the 
9IPR would only raise the monopoly power of patent holders, and U.S. exports to these 
countries would decrease.
Other empirical studies try to asses the response of domestic innovation in 
reforming countries to changes in IPR. Based on the observation that patent protection for 
computer programs was strengthened in the 1980s and 1990s, but firms that generated most 
of these patents reduced their R&D spending relative to sales, Bessen and Maskin (2000) 
argue that imitation might actually stimulate innovation. They suggest that, in a sequential 
setting, where each invention builds on the previous one, imitation may promote innovation, 
as the imitator might improve an idea that the initial inventor did not have. Therefore, 
stronger IPR may actually reduce the pace of innovation. Using firm level data on 307 
Japanese firms from 1980 to 1994, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) analyze the response of 
innovation to the 1987 Japanese patent reform. They do not find much evidence that 
domestic innovation in Japan responded to the changes in the patent regime. Lerner (2002) 
analyzes the impact of major patent regime changes in 60 countries over a period of 150 
years. Consistent with earlier work, he finds that domestic patent applications do not 
respond significantly to changes in patent policy. However, foreign entities do generate more 
applications in the reforming country after reforms. This suggests that FDI could be one 
alternative channel through which reforming countries could benefit from tighter IPR. Based 
on this observation, Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2004) assess empirically the impact of 
tighter IPR on the technology flows from the country undertaking FDI to the host country. 
Using data on U.S. multinationals’ affiliates in 12 countries that undertook major IPR 
reforms between 1982 and 1999, they find strong evidence that tighter IPR raises the 
technology transfers to the reforming countries. The volume of intrafirm royalty payments 
for intangibles, the affiliate R&D (considered a complement to technology transfers) and the 
foreign patent applications increase with stronger IPR in the host country of the subsidiary. 
Branstetter, et al. focus on deliberate technology flows, in the form of intrafirm royalty 
payments for intangibles paid by the subsidiary to the parent firm. These technology 
spillovers are deliberate, but an inventor may build his innovation using existing pieces of 
knowledge without compensating the original inventor. Nonetheless, one can still detect 
these spillovers through patent data. The inventor is legally obliged to disclose the source of 
any prior art in his patent application and this type of transfers of ideas or information is 
uncompensated. The literature, starting with the empirical research of Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
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Henderson (1993), uses patent citations to prior art as a proxy for technology flows of this 
nature. Our analysis focuses on this type of knowledge spillover.  
Other studies analyze the relationship between FDI and the strength of IPR regimes. 
Maskus (1998) provides empirical evidence that FDI by U.S. firms is sensitive to changes in 
patent regimes. To study the relationship between FDI and IPR, Lee and Mansfield (1996) 
use a survey of 100 major U.S. firms and data on U.S. FDI in manufacturing. They ask
questions about firms’ decision to invest in 14 developing countries in relationship to the 
IPR in those nations. They find evidence of a positive relationship between the perceived 
strength of the IPR in a country by the companies surveyed and the volume of U.S. FDI in 
that country. Their results are consistent with the earlier studies that found a positive impact 
of stronger IPR on FDI.
4. Methodology
The existing literature suggests that one of the potential benefits of the reforms for 
the countries undertaking them is that stronger IPR protection may induce larger knowledge 
spillovers between the U.S. and the reforming countries. American MNCs may be reluctant 
to let subsidiaries use their new technologies in countries with weak patent laws, from fear of 
imitation. Tightening of the IPR protection might be an incentive for these organizations to 
deploy critical technologies at a higher rate after developing countries have undertaken IPR 
reforms. One would expect to see this reflected in knowledge flows in the form of patent 
citations. U.S. multinational corporations might be cited more frequently by their subsidiaries 
in these countries. Moreover, domestic firms in the reforming countries might benefit from 
the geographic proximity to these American affiliates and start drawing more upon technical 
innovations generated in the U.S. This type of technology flow might be reflected in the 
patent citations of domestic companies to American firms. We use patent citation data to 
analyze how IPR strengthening affects these two forms of knowledge spillovers: (i) between 
U.S. parents and their affiliates, and (ii) between American and reforming countries domestic 
firms. This section describes our methodology in each case and addresses how it tackles two
identification issues.
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4.1. Knowledge spillovers between U.S. multinationals and their subsidiaries in the 
reforming countries
First, we empirically analyze whether the diffusion of new knowledge between U.S. 
parent firms and their affiliates in 12 countries increases after the reforms. We use a dataset 
composed of patents generated by affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the reforming 
countries. We test whether the subsidiaries make more citations to their parent firms in the 
U.S. after the countries’ patent systems have undergone significant reforms. 
Then, we study these citations, as it might be the characteristics of the patents cited
that change after the reforms, not necessarily their frequency. As mentioned before, U.S. 
multinational corporations might deploy new technologies that they were reluctant to let spill
over to their affiliates before reforms. We look for changes in the characteristics of the 
patents of MNCs cited by their subsidiaries, as they might indicate a change in the type of 
knowledge flowing between the host and home country of the multinational. We compare 
the number of citations received and made by these patents, but also measures correlated 
with these numbers, measures constructed by the authors of the NBER Patent-Citations 
data file. Nevertheless, finding differences might be unrelated to the presence of the U.S. 
affiliate in the reforming country. To be able to draw inferences, we subject our hypothesis 
to a stringent test. We compare these differences in characteristics of citations before and 
after reforms to a benchmark, that tells us what the expected difference is for the rest of 
citations in the dataset. We eliminate other confounding effects and try to get closer to 
distinguishing the impact of reforms on the diffusion of technology between the two 
countries. 
4.2. Knowledge spillovers between American and reforming countries domestic firms
As mentioned above, stronger IPR might facilitate the diffusion of knowledge from 
the U.S. to the reforming countries, through multinational corporations. Numerous studies 
suggest knowledge spillovers are localized. The geographic proximity of the affiliates to 
domestic firms might increase the flow of new technologies from the U.S. to domestic
companies in the reforming countries. These firms might not have access to American
innovations otherwise. To analyze this second hypothesis, we use a dataset of patents 
generated by domestic companies in the reforming countries. We test whether the reforms 
facilitate the flow of American innovations to them. In other words, we analyze whether 
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these domestic firms make more citations to U.S. companies after the country has 
undergone the reform of its patent system. Using the same method as before, after analyzing 
how the frequency of citing U.S. companies has changed after reforms, we look at different 
characteristics of the U.S. patents cited by the reforming countries domestic firms.
4.3. Controlling for unobserved effects
Two issues deserve attention. 
First, our data source is the NBER Patent-Citations data file. It contains all utility 
patents granted between January 1963 and December 1999. For each reforming country, we 
select patents with the application year 5 years before to 5 years after reforms. Because the 
application-grant mean lag is around 2 years [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002)] and reforms 
in some of the countries took place in the late 1990s, some application years are missing 
from our dataset. For example, 1996 is considered the year of major law changes in 
Argentina and we would like to have patents granted to U.S. subsidiaries in Argentina with 
the application year between 1991 and 2001. However, the latest application year in our
dataset for Argentina is 1997. These missing application years result in a nonrandom sample 
and, since the application year might be related to unobserved factors that affect the 
propensity to cite other patents, the selection might be endogenous and it can result in a 
sample selection bias in the OLS estimates. Even if other factors related to the application 
year are independent of the error term, our estimates are inefficient. We address this issue by 
using citing patent application year dummies that control for all unobserved factors that vary 
across application years. 
Second, as illustrated above, countries differ greatly in the level of IPR protection 
and the enforcement of the IPR laws. Therefore, reforms are very different among countries. 
We control for the different time-invariant characteristics of the reforming countries that 
might affect the subsidiaries’ propensity to cite by including country fixed effects. After 
running regressions both with and without these dummies, we find that these country 
differences are indeed strong. 
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5. Dataset Construction
This section describes the construction of our datasets and shows how it addresses 
some issues related to the variables used.
5.1. Patents assigned to U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming countries
To construct the dataset, we use the NBER Patent-Citations data file. The first 
inventor’s country is taken to be the country where the innovation took place. Alternative 
methods were used in the literature to assign location to patents. Thompson (2004) selects at 
random one inventor’s home address to denote the innovation location, while Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) make the selection based on pluralities of inventors. We 
use the first inventor’s address for programming ease and because it is a good estimator of 
the patent’s location. Hence, patents generated by U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming 
countries are those assigned to U.S. companies and a reforming country of innovation. The 
NBER dataset includes the assignee type according to the classification used by the USPTO.  
For each of the 12 reforming countries, we select all patents assigned to a U.S.
nongovernmental organization and the first inventor located in that country. From this initial 
set, we keep only 3,154 patents with an application date 5 years before to 5 years after the 
reform. Table 1 shows summary information about the patents assigned to U.S. subsidiaries 
in the reforming countries. 
TABLE 1. Patents assigned to U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming countries: Summary 
Statistics
Number of citing patents 3,154
Number of citations 19,942
Before reforms After reforms
Number of citations 8,782 11,160
Mean citations per patent 5.7 6.9
Using the USPTO website, we extract information on these patents, including all 
their citations to prior patents. We supplement these patents’ details with measures 
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constructed by the authors of the NBER dataset. Our dataset is composed of 19,942
citations contained in the patents of U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming countries. It is used to 
test whether subsidiaries in the reforming countries are more likely to cite their parent-firm 
after the reforms and whether these citations have different characteristics before and after 
reforms. We construct two dummy variables. The first, CITING PARENT is set equal to 1 
if the parent firm is cited by its affiliate in the reforming country, and 0 otherwise. A citation
made by one of the patents in our dataset to a patent assigned to the same U.S. company and 
American inventors is taken to be a citation to the subsidiary’s parent firm in the U.S. The 
second variable, REFORM is set equal to 1 if the citing patent application year is the year of 
or any year after the reform.
5.2. Patents assigned to domestic companies in the reforming countries
To test whether domestic firms in the reforming country are more likely to cite U.S.
companies after the reform, we construct a second dataset. Table 2 summarizes information 
about the patents assigned to local firms in the reforming countries. 
TABLE 2. Patents assigned to domestic companies in the reforming countries:
Summary Statistics
Number of citing patents 2,469
Number of citations 12,696
Before reforms After reforms
Number of citations 5,300 7,396
Mean citations per patent 5.1 5.2
We use again the NBER Patent-Citations data file. For each reforming country, we 
select the patents assigned to a firm and first inventor located in the country of reform. This 
is the set of all patents generated by domestic firms in the reforming country between 
January 1963 and December 1999. We consider the location of the first inventor as that 
where the innovation took place, the same method chosen to construct our first dataset. We 
keep 205,264 patents with the application date 5 years before to 5 years after the reform. We 
have disproportionately many observations for 3 countries (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan).
The dataset is composed of 203,759 patents assigned to companies in these 3 countries and 
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1,505 patents assigned to the 9 other countries. To construct a balanced dataset, we 
randomly select the first 50 patents for each application year and each of these countries and 
end up with a dataset of 2,469 patents assigned to domestic firms in the 12 reforming 
countries. This second dataset comprises 12,696 citations made by these patents and we 
extract information about these from the patents’ front page. We supplement our data with 
the constructed measures taken from the NBER data file. We construct two dummy
variables. The first, CITING US is set equal to 1 for citations to a U.S. assignee and an
American first inventor. These are taken to be citations to U.S. companies. The second 
variable is the same REFORM variable constructed for the first dataset, set equal to 1 for 
citing patent application year in the year of, or the years after the reform. This second set is
used to test whether domestic companies in the reforming countries are more likely to cite 
U.S. firms after the reforms and whether these citations have different characteristics before 
and after reforms.
5.3. Characteristics of the patents
As mentioned above, our study uses measures that describe our patents. These are 
the measures of generality, originality, the number of citations made and received, variables 
created by the authors of the NBER Patent-Citations data file. Generality is measured by
21
in
i ij
j
Generality s   [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002)], where ijs  is the percentage of 
citations received by patent i that belong to patent class j , out of in  patent classes. The 
higher the generality, the wider is the range of fields of patents that cite this patent.
Originality is measured by 21
in
i ij
j
Originality s  [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002)], 
where ijs  is the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to patent class j , out of 
in  patent classes. The higher the originality, the wider is the range of classes that are cited by 
the patent.
The patent’s originality and generality are positively correlated with the number of 
citations made and received, respectively. Patents that have a large number of citations 
received have higher generality scores on the average because, the higher the number of 
citations, the larger the number of technology classes covered. This leads to bias when we 
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compare the generality of patents before and after reforms because after reform patents are 
subject to a higher degree of truncation in the number of citations received. They can only
receive citations before 1999, which is the last grant year in our dataset. Hall (2005) 
calculated a generality measure adjusted for the number of citations received. This 
adjustment reduces, but does not eliminate, the decline in the average generality in the 1990s. 
We tackle this issue by adding cited patent application year dummies in the regressions with 
generality as the dependant variable. This purges the data of the effects of truncation. 
The number of citations made and received by the typical patent changes from year 
to year [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002)]. To compare the number of citations received 
before and after a reform and draw conclusions about the effect of the reform, we have to 
separate the difference in citation intensity that is due to other, unrelated factors. We address 
this issue by using an approach suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002). We express 
the number of citations received as a ratio to the average number of citations received by the 
typical patent in the same year of application. This rescaling eliminates other confounding 
effects and we are closer to finding the real effects of the reforms. We use the same practice 
to rescale the number of citations made. This method eliminates the effects of truncation, 
those due to systematic changes in the propensity to cite or due to changes in USPTO 
practices, but it has the inconvenience of eliminating changes over time in the impact 
(citations received) or importance (citations made) of patents, as well. 
6. Results
6.1. Raw mean tests
We start by conducting crude mean tests. Table 3 shows the results. We find that 
U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming countries made 8,782 citations before reforms and 7.3% of 
those were citations to their parent firm in the U.S. The frequency of citing their parent 
company did not change after the reforms. The patents of domestic companies in the 
reforming countries cite U.S. firms 46.6% of the time before reforms. We find that the 
frequency of citing the U.S. decreases, but the magnitude of the change is less than one
percentage point. 
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TABLE 3. Comparison of means, before and after reforms
CITATIONS ASSIGNED TO U.S. 
SUBSIDIARIES IN 
REFORMING COUNTRIES
CITATIONS ASSIGNED TO 
DOMESTIC COMPANIES IN 
REFORMING COUNTRIES
Number of 
observations
19,942 12,696
Before reform After reform Before reform After reform
Number of 
observations
8,782 11,160 5,300 7,396
CITING PARENT CITING U.S.
Fraction 0.073 0.072 0.466 0.458
As mentioned above, the reforms might have an impact on the characteristics of the 
patents cited. We further explore the citing patterns of U.S. subsidiaries in the reforming 
countries. Table 4 shows the mean measures of originality and generality and the number of 
citations received and made of American MNCs patents cited by their affiliates. The 
numbers of citations received and made are rescaled by the mean per application year to 
account for the steep decline in the number of citations received in the 1990s, because 1999 
is the last grant year in our dataset.
TABLE 4. Comparison of the characteristics of patents cited by U.S. affiliates in the 
reforming countries 
BEFORE REFORMS AFTER REFORMS
Number of observations 8,782 11,160
Citing 
parent
Not Citing 
parent
Citing 
parent
Not Citing 
parent T-test
Number of observations 645 8,137 801 10,359
Mean Originality 0.404
(0.011)
0.342
(0.003)
0.424
(0.010)
0.351
(0.003) -0.71
Mean Generality 0.507
(0.011)
0.430
(0.003)
0.450
(0.010)
0.405
(0.003) 2.07
Mean Citations Made 1.230
(0.040)
1.029
(0.010)
1.355
(0.045)
1.032
(0.010) -1.97
Mean Citations Received 3.928
(0.205)
2.804
(0.038)
3.938
(0.132)
3.082
(0.037) 1.07
Standard errors in parentheses
When we compare the citations to parents with the rest of the citations in the 
dataset, the average citation of a subsidiary to its parent is more original after reforms by
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only about 0.011, an insignificant difference. Supportive of a positive correlation between 
the measure of originality and the number of citations made, the average citation of the 
affiliate to its parent makes 0.122 more citations after reforms, after rescaling the number of 
citations made by the mean per application year. The difference is significant at the 5% level.
On the other hand, the average patent is about 0.032 less general after reforms, on the 
average and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. This effect is probably 
due to the fact that after reform patents are subject to a higher degree of truncation in the 
number of citations received and this number is positively correlated with the measure of 
generality. In other words, patents that are highly cited are more general, on the average. We 
will control for the different degree of truncation by introducing cited patent application year 
dummies in our specifications. Contrary to our expectations, we find that citations to parents 
receive 0.268 less citations after reforms, even after rescaling this number by the method 
described above, but the finding is not significant. 
TABLE 5. Comparison of the characteristics of patents cited by domestic companies 
in the reforming countries
BEFORE REFORMS AFTER REFORMS
Number of observations 5,300 7,396
Citing U.S. Not Citing 
U.S.
Citing U.S. Not Citing 
U.S. T-test
Number of observations 2,470 2,830 3,387 4,009
Mean Originality 0.400
(0.006)
0.327
(0.005)
0.386
(0.005)
0.307
(0.004) -0.60
Mean Generality 0.499
(0.005)
0.429
(0.005)
0.439
(0.005)
0.364
(0.004) -0.52
Mean Citations Made 1.238
(0.022)
0.847
(0.011)
1.207
(0.019)
0.781
(0.009) -1.08
Mean Citations Received 2.905
(0.075)
3.888
(0.245)
2.771
(0.062)
2.454
(0.076) -4.75
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 5 replicates Table 4 for citations made by patents assigned to domestic firms in 
the reforming countries. The difference in the mean measure of originality between the 
citations to the U.S. and the rest of the citations in the dataset does not change after reforms. 
The same difference in the number of citations made decreases by 0.035 after the reforms, a 
very small and insignificant number. Citations made by local companies to U.S. firms are less 
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general after reforms when compared to the rest of citations, but the finding is not 
significant. When we rescale the number of citations received to eliminate the effect of 
truncation, the citations to the U.S. receive 1.3 more citations after reforms when compared 
to the rest of the citations in the dataset. The difference is both large and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
6.2. Estimation results for the citing patterns of U.S. affiliates in the reforming 
countries
As these univariate tests might be confounded with composition effects, we now 
turn to the results of our multivariate estimation. We first test the hypothesis that U.S. 
multinationals are cited more after the reforms by their affiliates in the reforming countries 
Table 6 summarizes the results of logit estimation. 
TABLE 6. Citations of U.S. affiliates in the reforming countries: Logit Estimates 
(Odds Ratios reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Year and country 
dummies
Year dummies Country dummies
(a) Conditional logit estimates
REFORM 0.989
(-1.20)
1.212
(0.71)
0.656
(-2.31)
0.982
(-0.19)
Number of 
observations
12,120 12,120 12,120 12,120
(b) Unconditional logit estimates
REFORM 0.975
(-0.45)
1.328
(1.53)
0.676
(-2.97)
1.062
(1.08)
Number of 
observations
19,942 19,802 19,836 19,908
Z-scores in parentheses
The dependent variable is CITING PARENT. The independent variable is 
REFORM. The citation patterns are not independent of the citing patents. A model with 
fixed effects per citing patent would not estimate the coefficient on REFORM, as there is no
within-group variation in this independent variable. Because we still need to control for 
systematic differences across citations, we employ a conditional logit model with fixed 
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effects per primary examiner of the citing patent. Examiners differ in their field of 
specialization and we expect that citing patterns are not independent of the primary 
examiner of the citing patent. An advantage of the model with primary examiner fixed 
effects over the citing patent fixed effects specification is the reduction in the number of 
observations lost due to lack of within-group variation in the dependent variable. The 
average patent in our set makes 6.3 citations, but there are 17.8 patents, on the average, that 
share the same primary examiner. Hence, the number of groups with no variation in the 
dependent variable is reduced. Panel (a) summarizes the results of the conditional logit. 
Odds ratios are reported. Model (1) contains one independent variable, REFORM. As 
mentioned, our dataset is missing application years for some countries. To account for the 
missing observations and to control for any unobserved factors that vary across application 
years, we add citing patent application year dummies in specifications (2) and (3). Models (2) 
and (4) add reforming country dummies to account for the significant differences that exist 
across countries in the level of IPR protection and the reforms undertaken. The estimates 
for the year and country dummies are not reported. The use of the conditional logit does not 
allow us to obtain consistent estimates for the fixed effects. In addition, 7822 observations 
are lost due to lack of within-group variation in the dependent variable. An alternative is to 
use unconditional logit estimation. Panel (b) shows the results of unconditional logit
estimation. Hausman specification tests were performed to decide whether estimation using 
the unconditional logit is appropriate. Under the null hypothesis of homogeneity, both 
estimators are consistent, but Chamberlain’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator is 
inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, the unconditional estimator is inconsistent, 
whereas the conditional estimator is consistent and efficient. Only in model (4), that includes
only country dummies, estimation using the conditional logit is needed, as the Hausman test 
suggests that there are significant primary examiner effects. For models (1), (2), and (3), the 
Hausman test suggests that, although both the conditional logit and the unconditional logit 
give consistent estimators, the conditional logit estimates are less efficient and thus, the 
unconditional logit is chosen. Only model (3) with year dummies produces significant 
estimates. Contrary to our expectations, it shows U.S. subsidiaries are less likely to cite their 
parent firms after the reforms. When we add country dummies, the estimate is marginally 
significant and it shows that affiliates are more likely to cite their parent companies after 
the reforms. The big change in the estimate of our coefficient suggests there are indeed 
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strong country differences, as we expected given the disparity of the IPR reforms and their 
enforcement among the 12 countries studied. Table 7 shows the frequency with which U.S. 
affiliates are citing their parent firms before and after reforms in each country. These results 
are not consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. multinationals are cited more by their 
affiliates after the reforms.
TABLE 7. Frequency of citations to parent company
Country Before reform After reform
Argentina 0.034 0
Brazil 0.093 0.053
China 0 0.022
Indonesia 0 0.032
Japan 0.074 0.080
South Korea 0 0.053
Mexico 0.045 0.013
The Philippines 0.526 0.231
Spain 0.194 0.097
Taiwan 0.023 0.051
Thailand 0 0
Turkey 0.048 0
We turn now to analyze the impact of the reforms on different characteristics of the 
American MNCs patents cited by their subsidiaries. When testing the hypothesis that the 
citations of affiliates to their parents have changed after the reforms, the dependent variable 
denotes the characteristic of the patent cited. We use four dependent variables, taken from 
the NBER data file: ORIGINALITY, GENERALITY, CITATIONS RECEIVED and 
CITATIONS MADE. As mentioned above, the measures of citations made and received are 
divided by the mean number of citations made and received by patents in the specific 
application year. We rescale these measures to separate other confounding effects that 
change the number of citations made and received by the typical patent during different 
application years. The measures of generality and originality, defined above, are numbers 
bounded between 0 and 1. If y denotes our dependent variable, the originality and generality 
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measures, respectively, and X denotes our independent variables, our model is described by
the equation:  
1
1 exp
y
X   . We perform the logit transformation to map the 
dependent variable to the real line. The resulting model is: ln
1
y
X
y
 . The 
transformation will result in missing values for the observations where the dependent 
variable is 0 or 1 and the observations will be dropped when we estimate the new model, but
we can now estimate the model with the transformed dependent variable using OLS. 
Table 8 shows the results of estimation. Measures of originality, generality, the 
number of citations made and received are compared before and after reforms for citations 
to multinationals with the rest of the citations in the dataset. There are three regressors: 
CITING PARENT, REFORM, and INTERACTION, an interaction term between the two. 
We are most interested in our estimate of the coefficient on INTERACTION. It shows the 
change in the mean characteristic of the citations to parents before and after reforms 
compared with the same difference for the rest of the citations made by the multinationals’ 
subsidiaries. If our hypothesis is correct, we expect to find a positive coefficient on 
INTERACTION, suggesting that the patents cited by the affiliates and assigned to their 
parents are more important or have a wider impact, relative to other patents cited by the 
subsidiaries, after the reforms.
Panel (a) summarizes the estimates of models without dummies. Panel (b) shows the 
same regressions with citing patent application year and reforming country dummies. When 
the generality measure is the dependent variable, cited patent application year dummies are 
added to eliminate the effects of truncation in the number of citations received at the end of 
the period. Hausman tests are conducted to decide between a primary examiner fixed effects 
model and a model without fixed effects. According to the Hausman test, the model without 
fixed effects would produce inconsistent estimates and the model with fixed effects per 
primary examiner of the citing patent is chosen in all instances. The results of the latter are 
reported.
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TABLE 8.  Citations assigned to U.S. affiliates in the reforming countries: 
Characteristics Estimates 
Dependent 
variable
Number of 
observations
CITING 
PARENT
REFORM INTERACTION
(a) Estimation without dummies
ORIGINALITY 13,177
0.114
(2.90)
-0.063
(-3.07)
0.016
(0.30)
GENERALITY 16,050
0.101
(2.71)
-0.028
(-1.42)
0.005
(0.10)
CITATIONS 
MADE
19,942
0.169
(3.95)
-0.019
(-0.91)
0.101
(1.76)
CITATIONS 
RECEIVED
19,941
0.934
(6.36)
0.102
(1.41)
-0.355
(-1.80)
(b) Estimation with year and country dummies
ORIGINALITY 13,177
0.111
(2.81)
-0.096
(-1.74)
0.020
(0.37)
GENERALITY 16,050
0.099
(2.64)
-0.070
(-1.34)
0.005
(0.09)
CITATIONS 
MADE
19,942
0.174
(4.06)
-0.146
(-2.57)
0.093
(1.61)
CITATIONS 
RECEIVED
19,941
0.936
(6.36)
-0.311
(-1.60)
-0.405
(-2.05)
T-values in parentheses
The estimates of the coefficient on CITING PARENT are all significant at the 1% 
confidence level, regardless if year and country dummies are used or not in the specification. 
We find that patents assigned to U.S. MNCs that are cited by their subsidiaries are, on the 
average, more original and general (by about 0.1) than the rest of the patents cited in the 
dataset, they make about 0.17 more citations and receive, on the average, almost 1 citation 
more than the rest of the patents cited. 
The estimate of the coefficient on INTERACTION is close to 0 and insignificant
for ORIGINALITY and GENERALITY. This suggests the citing patterns of U.S. affiliates 
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do not change in the average level of generality or originality after the reforms. In other 
words, the average citation to a parent firm is not different in originality or generality after 
the reform, after comparing it to the rest of the citations. We find that patents citing 
multinationals make about 0.10 more citations after reforms, when compared to the rest of 
the patents cited by the U.S. subsidiaries. The estimate of the coefficient on
INTERACTION is significant at the 10% level when no dummies are used and it is
marginally significant at the 10% level when dummies for country and application year are 
introduced. This is a counter-intuitive result, since the measure of originality and the number 
of citations made are positively correlated and we could not find any effect of the reforms 
on the originality measure. However, a magnitude of 0.10 difference of in the number of 
citations made after reforms is indeed quite small.
In contrast to the previous results, we do find significant effects of IPR reforms on 
citations received. Nevertheless, the result is surprising. After rescaling the dependent 
variable by the mean per application year to eliminate the effects of truncation, we find that 
patents that cite parents exhibit a relative decline in the number of citations received. They
receive about 0.4 fewer citations after reforms, when compared to the rest of the patents 
cited by the U.S. affiliates. We find an estimate significant at the 10% confidence level for 
the model without dummies and at the 5% when dummies are introduced. These results 
show a decline of the importance of patents that cite parents after reforms, when compared 
to the rest of the patents cited by U.S. subsidiaries. They suggest reforms do not encourage 
U.S. multinationals to deploy new critical technologies at a higher rate after reforms and 
citations of affiliates to their parents become less important after reforms. 
6.3. Estimation results for the citing patterns of domestic firms in the reforming 
countries 
We continue the study of the impact of IPR reforms on the international diffusion of 
knowledge by testing the second hypothesis. We analyze whether domestic companies in the 
reforming countries change their citing patterns after the reforms. One would expect to find 
that they make more citation to U.S. companies after the reforms, as the strengthening of 
the IPR system might accelerate the diffusion of knowledge from the U.S. to the reforming 
country. Table 9 replicates Table 6 for the second dataset that contains patents generated by 
domestic companies in the reforming countries. The dependent variable, CITING US, is a 
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dummy variable equal to one for citations to U.S. firms. We construct the same dummy 
variable REFORM equal to 1 when the citing patent’s application year is the year of or any 
year after the reform. Odds ratios are reported. 
TABLE 9. Citations assigned to domestic companies in the reforming countries: 
Logit Estimates 
(Odds Ratios reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Year and country 
dummies
Year dummies Country dummies
(a) Conditional logit estimates
REFORM 0.921
(-1.38)
0.970
(-0.23)
0.893
(-1.59)
0.951
(-0.75)
Number of 
observations
11,949 11,949 11,949 11,949
(b) Unconditional logit estimates
REFORM 0.968
(-0.90)
0.913
(-1.12)
0.978
(-0.52)
0.907
(-2.49)
Number of 
observations
12,696 12,695 12,696 12,695
Z-scores in parentheses
Panel (a) summarizes the results of the conditional logit estimation with fixed effects 
per primary examiner of the citing patent. 747 observations are lost due to lack of within-
group variation in the dependent variable. Model (1) contains only one independent variable, 
REFORM. The following specifications add citing patent application year dummies and 
reforming country dummies. The dummies estimates are not reported. Panel (b) shows the 
results of unconditional logit estimation, without fixed effects. Hausman tests are performed 
to decide whether the conditional logit is needed as the citing patents are not independent of 
their citations. The unconditional logit is chosen only in the specification without dummies
[model (1)], as the Hausman specification test shows both models are consistent, but the 
fixed effects model produces less efficient estimates. The estimate of the coefficient on 
REFORM is close to 1 and insignificant. It suggests there is no change in the frequency of 
citations made by local companies to American firms after reforms. These results do not 
change after controlling for unobservable factors that vary over time and among countries. 
The conditional logit with primary examiner fixed effects is chosen for the specifications
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with dummies, as, according to the Hausman test, estimation without fixed effects would 
produce inconsistent estimates. The estimate of the coefficient on REFORM is insignificant. 
We conclude that we cannot find any change in the frequency of citations made by domestic 
firms to U.S. companies after reforms. 
Although we do not find evidence for the hypothesis that the reforms of the patent 
systems accelerate the international flow of new technologies from the U.S. to the reforming 
countries, we look deeper at the characteristics of the American patents cited by the 
domestic firms. In other words, we study the hypothesis that, although stronger IPR does 
not affect the frequency of citing the U.S., it changes the type of patents being cited. Table 
10 replicates Table 8 for patents assigned to domestic companies in the reforming countries. 
The dependent variables are the same, but the explanatory variables are: CITING 
U.S., REFORM, and INTERACTION, an interaction term between the first two variables. 
Hausman specification tests suggest the primary examiner fixed effects models are needed in 
all instances, as the specifications without fixed effects generate inconsistent estimates. Panel 
(a) summarizes the estimation results for regressions without application year and country 
dummies. Panel (b) includes these dummies. We use the same method as before to eliminate 
the effects of truncation in the number of citations received at the end of the period. When 
GENERALITY is the dependent variable, specifications include cited patent application 
year dummies. 
When we compare the citations generated by domestic companies to U.S. firms with 
all the other citations, we find that they are more original and general, they make more 
citations, but receive less citations, even after rescaling the number of citations received by 
the mean per year to eliminate the effects of truncation. 
The results suggest there are no changes after reforms in the measures of originality, 
generality, and the number of citations made by citations of domestic firms to the U.S., 
when compared to the rest of the citations. All estimates of the coefficient on the interaction 
term are insignificant. Results are almost unchanged when application year and country 
dummies are added to control for unobservables that affect the characteristics of the 
citations and vary over time and countries. In contrast, we find that citations to American 
firms receive 0.78 more citations, on the average, after reforms. The estimate of the 
coefficient on the interaction term is significant at the 1% confidence level. That is, we find a 
relative increase in importance of U.S. patents cited after reforms. These results suggest 
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reforms are beneficial for the reforming countries’ domestic companies. They foster 
innovation there, by mediating the transfer of new more important technologies from the 
U.S. 
TABLE 10.  Citations assigned to domestic companies in the reforming countries: 
Characteristics Estimates 
Dependent 
variable
Number of 
observations
CITING 
U.S.
REFORM INTERACTION
(a) Estimation without dummies
ORIGINALITY 8351
0.060
(2.25)
-0.107
(-3.48)
0.052
(1.49)
GENERALITY 10,361
0.144
(5.68)
-0.023
(-0.79)
-0.022
(-0.64)
CITATIONS 
MADE
12,693
0.341
(13.32)
-0.016
(-0.58)
0.037
(1.11)
CITATIONS 
RECEIVED
12,687
-0.313
(-1.52)
-0.412
(-1.82)
0.782
(2.93)
(b) Estimation with year and country dummies
ORIGINALITY 8351
0.056
(2.08)
-0.097
(-1.71)
0.053
(1.51)
GENERALITY 10,361
0.144
(5.67)
0.170
(3.15)
-0.023
(-0.70)
CITATIONS 
MADE
12,693
0.338
(13.19)
-0.019
(-0.36)
0.033
(0.97)
CITATIONS 
RECEIVED
12,687
-0.287
(-1.40)
-1.296
(-3.03)
0.787
(2.94)
T-values in parentheses
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7. Conclusions
The existing literature suggests that one of the potential benefits of the reforms of 
the patent system is access to foreign innovations that the reforming country obtains in the 
presence of stronger IPR.
This paper assesses the impact of IPR reforms on the international diffusion of 
knowledge through FDI. We test two hypotheses. First, we construct a dataset composed of 
patents generated by U.S. affiliates in 12 reforming countries and test whether they change 
the pattern of citing their parent companies. We do not find evidence that supports this 
hypothesis. Moreover, our results show that these citations are not different in characteristics 
after the country has undertaken the reform. One exception is found when using the number 
of citations received as a measure of patent importance. We find a post-reform decline in 
importance of patents of MNCs cited by their subsidiaries, relative to all other patents cited. 
We then construct a second dataset composed of patents generated by domestic 
companies in the reforming countries. We use it to compare their frequency of citing 
American firms before and after reforms. We hypothesize that, due to geographic proximity 
to U.S. subsidiaries, these domestic companies might benefit of increased knowledge 
spillovers from the U.S. after the reforms. We do not find evidence that the frequency of 
citing the U.S. has changed after reforms, but when the number of citations received is used 
as a proxy for the importance of patents, we find that patents of U.S. companies cited by 
domestic firms increase in relative performance after reforms. This suggests reforms favor 
domestic innovation efforts rather than affiliate efforts. 
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